Kant's Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals is an exploration and argument that seeks a universally binding first principle for morals. Kant presents an essay in which empirical observations and facts are not adequate to answer the question of, why be moral? Instead Kant relies on theoretical concepts, such as autonomy, morality, duty and goodwill to explain how necessity and causality are ordered. In this essay I will attempt to explain the Kantian connection between freedom and morality.
In order to demonstrate the relationship between the Kantian notion of freedom and morality, I will first briefly summarize Kant's broader explanations of good will, duty and the categorical imperative. Kant begins his argument with the
Based upon the above explanation of freedom and morality, it seems that Kant has created a circular argument for the meaning of morality. However in order to get past this circularity, we must return to the theme of a universal moral law, one that is not dependent on any experience, specifically we must demonstrate the division between the sensible world, that is, the empirical world of cause and effect, and the intelligible world of pure conception. The main difference between these two ‘worlds' is the immutability factor. The intelligible world, since it is made of pure concepts, is understood by everyone, whereas the sensible world is conditioned upon the understanding of the circumstance and therefore does not provide a candidate for moral law. Concerning a person's capacity for freedom, as previously stated, we are only free when we are acting out moral law, that is the categorical imperative, however since moral law is universal, moral law must be regulated in the intelligible world. Although Kant admits that as humans it is not possible to exist purely in the intelligible world, it is possible to know that we are part of the intelligible world, without fully understanding what the intelligible world entails. For example, according to Kant, it would seem that we are know about the world based upon our impressions gained in the sensible world of appearances, but we understand that although the intelligible