This reading, according to Steinberger, is unpersuasive in a couple of ways. Firstly, Steinberger realizes that the moral law is not guided by the mere logical consistence. Steinberger reviews Harrison’s argument that the maxim of breaking promises , if universalized, undermine the systematic harmony of purposes. Since such result is based on experience of breaking promises. Kemp argues that Kant indicates self-contradiction in the CI is essentially logical. Steinberger takes Harrison’s point is at best the causal ones, not logical impossibilities. I will call this ‘reason alone consistence’ later because reason cannot alone identify the moral law.
Secondly, Steinberger points out that if the consequences of the universalization of a maxim are contradictory in no way does this imply that the maxim itself is contradictory. He says,

I take this to be a much stronger version of the argument from consequences. As such, it has become, in one form or another, the standard view. According to this view, the maxim of action A is said to be ruled out if its universalization would make it impossible subsequently to perform actions similar to A. this formulation is not only widely accepted; it also has a very strong textual warrant(Gr423). We must, therefore, be surprised to realize that in fact it describes nothing that could even remotely be called a
By external obligation Kant means that if moral feeling is universally applicable then it must be able to be externally specified and tested since human will does not merely depend on inner feelings. For example, a selfish action fails an external test since it does not benefit the majority of people nor speak highly of human nature. Much like Utilitarianism, Kant holds that only ‘well-behaved’ and rational choices meet the test of external obligation which ultimately undermines the subjective view of the