14 of 831 DOCUMENTS

In re TOBACCO CASES II.

S129522

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

41 Cal. 4th 1257; 163 P.3d 106; 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418; 2007 Cal. LEXIS 8189

August 2, 2007, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: US Supreme Court certiorari denied by Daniels v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1649, 170 L. Ed. 2d 354, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2467 (U.S., 2008)

PRIOR HISTORY:
Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, No. D041356. Superior Court of San Diego County, JCCP No. 4042, Ronald S. Prager, Judge.
In re Tobacco Cases II, 123 Cal. App. 4th 617, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 1800 (Cal. App. 4th Dist., 2004)

DISPOSITION: The judgment of the intermediate appellate court was affirmed.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiffs filed a class action against defendant tobacco companies, alleging that defendants' advertising and marketing practices violated California's unfair competition law (UCL). The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment and entered judgment for defendants. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs petitioned for review.

OVERVIEW: The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), 15 U.S.C. ß 1331 et seq. Plaintiffs' UCL claim sought to impose on defendants a duty not to advertise in a way that could encourage minors to smoke. However, the UCL claim was subject to preemption because it was necessarily and inherently based on concerns about smoking and health. Defendants' cigarette advertising concerned lawful activity because it was addressed to adults who could legally purchase and use cigarettes. Treating defendants' conduct in advertising their cigarettes as aiding and abetting a violation of Pen. Code, ß 308, whenever a minor acquired the cigarettes defendants marketed was not a reasonable fit with the state's purpose of discouraging youth smoking. The state had many other means of carrying out its policy of discouraging minors from smoking. The First Amendment's free speech guarantee did not permit defendants' advertising to be treated as the aiding and abetting of a criminal offense. Consequently, plaintiffs could not escape the FCLAA's preemptive force by claiming that defendants' conduct constituted an inchoate criminal offense.

OUTCOME: The judgment of the intermediate appellate court was affirmed.

CORE TERMS: cigarette, advertising, smoking, tobacco, preempt, cigarette advertising--, preemption, unfair competition law, state law, labeling, Advertising Act FCLAA, preempted, plurality, youth, plur, tobacco products, inchoate, unfair, cause of action, commercial speech, attorneys general, warning, joined, promotion, advertisements, pre-emption, fraudulent, settlement, target, Constitutional Law

LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause > Federal Preemption
[HN1] The Supremacy Clause of U.S. Const., art. VI, grants Congress the power to preempt state law. State law that conflicts with federal law is without effect. Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states are not to be superseded by a federal act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis.

Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause > Federal Preemption
[HN2] Federal preemption arises in three circumstances. First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments preempt state law. Preemption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent, and when Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one. Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is preempted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress