Kodak’s business structure had been heavily based in vertical integration and self-sufficiency. It was in control of its value chain and did everything internally from developing its own technology, producing its own products, and supplying them worldwide. Anyhow, Kodak lacked expertise and the pace needed to overcome rapid technological change. Therefore Kodak’s looked for outside help. In order facilitate its digital strategy Kodak’s hired the executives and specialists needed. Obviously it was too late, most of the value-chain was already in the hands of well establish companies; some even dominant in specific areas. As more and more firms entered the market, Kodak found its hands full with little commit to anything. Nonetheless, like Willy Shih, head of Kodak’s digital imaging product (1997-2003), stated it needed to pick where it wanted to add value and commoditize where it couldn’t. The challenge was identifying the activities and products it could add value to. In the path of trying to position itself in the digital market Kodak’s created a number of joint ventures and alliances with Canon, AOL, Intel, HP, and many other companies. In 2000s Kodak’s also made a number of acquisitions where it felt “that a strong proprietary position was essential to its strategy and in technologies where it needed to complement its own expertise.” From 1993 to 2012 Kodak digital strategy stood on the belief that digital technology could not eliminate printed images. Kodak clearly entered a weak stage when it hit bankruptcy in 2012. However, it managed to maintain and accumulate “potentially valuable resources and capabilities.”
• Brand: Kodak’s had already established a global presence and well recognized brand. Even though it had two