Westermarck (1862-1939), “The Sources of Moral Ideas: Society, Custom, and
Sympathy”

Question: Are there any objective moral judgments?
Are moral judgments about some reality, and so true/false insofar as they correspond with that reality?
Are moral judgments one’s that all persons with intellect/reason concur in making? I. Definition of objectivity
Objectivity in judgment requires that:
(a) The judgment can be seen to be true by everyone who has all the information relevant to the truth, i.e. “the recognition of facts as true by all who understand them fully”
AND
(b) The judgment can be true
II. The argument from disagreement
Human beings have different emotional constitutions.
A person’s emotional constitution is the basis of his or her moral judgment.
Therefore, there is no way to achieve unanimous agreement on many moral judgments. Therefore, many moral judgments aren’t objective. Criterion (a) is violated in the case of many moral judgments.
III. A theory of moral judgments that Westermarck rejects: Disagreement in particular moral judgments masques agreement, amongst those with developed reasoning capacities, about fundamental moral principles. Disagreement in particular moral judgments will disappear under full information.
Some have argued that morality is grounded in reason, and so that moral judgments are objective. Everyone using their reason correctly will come to the same moral judgment about any situation. People do disagree in the particular moral judgments they make – some will say that abortion is morally prohibited, others that it is morally permitted – but this disagreement in particular moral judgments is compatible with agreement about fundamental moral principles.

Fundamental moral principles are perspicuous to human reason. Disagreement about particular moral matters comes about as people apply these fundamental moral principles differently to different situations because they are not aware of all the morally relevant factors in a particular situation. Thus, agreement about fundamental moral principles will lead to agreement in particular moral judgments once individuals (with a developed reasoning capacity) are made aware of all the morally relevant factors.
IV. Westermarck’s critique of this theory
W: There is some agreement amongst those with developed reasoning capacities in the moral evaluations that they make. For example with respect to the idea that motivation is relevant to moral evaluation and that children/lower animals are less responsible for their actions than adults, there is agreement. But this agreement is very limited. The particular moral judgments that people make vary greatly.
W: The theory holds that people with developed reasoning capacities agree as to fundamental moral principle, but only differ as to how they apply these principles given the different information (sometimes erroneous) they have about particular situations.
W: But can an example be given of what these agreed upon fundamental moral principle, perspicuous to reason, are? The best candidate is the utilitarian principle, advanced by Sidgwick:

U: “I ought not prefer my own lesser good for the greater good of another” W: But who agrees with this principle, supposedly fundamental and perspicuous to human reason? Humanity generally rejects this principle.
It flies in the face of empirical observation to say that all humans with developed reasoning capacities agree about Utilitarianism or any other substantive moral principle.
V. A response to this that W considers and rejects
The response: All those who are enlightened accept Utilitarianism, and so there is unanimity – a requirement of objectivity – with respect to
Utilitarianism.
W’s answer: But this just amounts to saying that MY VIEWS ABOUT
MORALITY ARE THE OBJECTIVE VIEWS. The proponent of any theory of morality can say that all those who are enlightened agree with my theory, claim that their