Our model of standing ovations demonstrates the effects of grievances, peer effects, quality of decision, and threshold. Collective action is a main factor that determines intrastate conflict. As Granovettor’s “Peer Effects “model explain each person making a decision has a peer pressure threshold. Basically, the outcome stands on if the quality of the decision is higher than the individual’s peer pressure threshold. If the quality is greater than the peer pressure threshold than the individual is more likely to follow their peers, but if the peer pressure threshold is greater than the quality than the individual is less likely to join their peers in the decision that they are making. The case in Syria is rather odd to me when you are comparing it to the standing ovation model that we are currently using in this course. The rebels in Syria have very expensive machinery and equipment that they are using to attack and defend them against the government’s army. In the reading a Syrian soldier said that they are using bullets that cost 3 dollars per bullet and bombs that cost somewhere around thousands of dollars. This is very expensive for a group of rebels who are fighting the government’s army to maintain. From this alone I would assume that the quality of the decision of joining the rebels would be very low due to the fact of how expensive the equipment is that they are using. From the readings, I’m rather convinced that the government is not funding the weaponry for the rebels. Where are they getting the money from? Low quality in decision usually means that it would be less likely for one to make that decision to join forces with the rebels. In this case, the low quality doesn’t seem to have the same effect that the standing ovation model that we are using predicts. Another factor that I’m not quite sure fits into the theory of the standing ovation model is how outnumbered the soldiers of the rebellion are. Although their number is increasing, they are still highly