The US failure to defeat the communist forces up to 1975 was due to a range of military and political failures. These failures included US support for the corrupt Diem Government, US escalation under Johnson, Strategies, the Tet offensive, the resignation of Johnson, Nixon, opposition on the US homefront and withdrawal that led to the fall of Saigon in 1975. These factors effectively caused the Viet Kong and North Vietnamese victory.

The US Policy of Containment was to prevent the spread of communism abroad, mainly in South-East Asia. After the fall of China to Communism, Eisenhower was convinced that the fall of Vietnam would lead to the fall of Burma, Thailand and Indonesia; he therefore backed Diem’s decision to not hold the elections in 1956. In Diem, the US thought they would establish a strong and powerful leader, as opposed to Communism and hoped he would become the leader of a new democratic Vietnam. Diem, however, was not a democrat; he used his family ties to help govern and never won widespread support. This was an essential part in the failure of the US to contain and defeat the Viet Cong, as their solution to communism was not a strong enough leader to oppose Ho Chi Minh and draw enough support to defeat the North Vietnamese.

Under Kennedy’s government, the number of US advisers increased. These came about from a reluctance to get directly involved and allowed them to indirectly support the Diem regime. Advisers were assigned to every level of Government and Military with numbers rising from 900 in 1960 to 11 000 by the end of 1962. The Mansfield Report by Senator Mike Mansfield shows his disapproval for the Diem Government. Mansfield felt that the efforts in Vietnam would most likely fail and was only harmful to the interests of the US. It was his belief that the US backed Vietnam because it was convenient and Symbolic to do so and it was not vital to the interests of America. Mansfield recommended the neutralisation of the region and the withdrawal of US advisers. The Mansfield report was rejected. Mansfield’s assessment of Vietnam proved to be right, and it is clear that if the US military had successfully adhered to the requirements of Mansfield, they would not have suffered the ultimate defeat that was Vietnam.

The failure of policies to undermine Communism helped their eventual victory.
The Strategic Hamlets scheme was intended to prevent the Viet Cong from finding support and shelter in the country. Villagers were moved into fortified ‘Hamlets’ with their homes being destroyed to prevent the Guerrillas using them, and provide the Villagers with medical services and education. Although they managed to isolate the Viet Cong, the program also alienated the locals who were belonged to their own land. Diem and the US Air Force conducted a campaign of bombings attempting to eradicate the Viet Cong, despite the fact that Diem’s people were also being hit. This did not help the US with ‘Tipping the balance’1 in their favour as it created resentment amongst the Vietnamese people. ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ was a United States Military campaign designed to win the popular support of the people of Vietnam. The campaign incorporated a continuance of the strategic hamlets program, combined with support and aid to locals. The constant redeployment of the US trust did not allow trust to grow between them and the people of Vietnam. The mutual suspicion and distrust accompanied by a lack of interaction meant that the ‘Hearts and Minds’ program failed. Diem’s regime was incredibly repressive in nature. His Catholicism made him show favouritism over the Buddhists who were the majority. Administrators replaced elected village councils and people were encouraged to tell authorities if their neighbours were thought to be sympathetic to communists. In May 1963 he banned the celebration of Budda’s birthday, which triggered a series of riots and the self-immolation of monks. This decision proved as he upset the