In 1990 reviews were done of NASA and its programs by an executive named Norman Augustine. He concluded the budget was grossly underfunded at that time. His recommendations to increase the budget to 30 billion a year by 2000 was not received well by congress. Instead congress preferred NASA to produce valuable scientific and symbolic payoffs without receiving increases. Between 1993 and 2002 NASA lost 13% in purchasing power over a decade. Over time with budget cuts NASA lost a net total of 540 million dollars which drained their valuable resources for the core task of the agency. Over three decades the shuttle program was hit the hardest during the Clinton-Bush budget constraints. This played a major role in accountability and responsiveness because if there are no workers and no money, who can you rely on to make sure that the important task are accomplished?

In 1992 power began to shift with Daniel Goldin who served as the NASA Administrator from 1992-2001. He applied several principles during his tenure to include no bureaucratic control but strategic direction with operating units of authority and resources. He didn’t agree with checks and balances he believed those carrying out the work were ultimately responsible for its quality. Our readings from Long and Fredickson again suggest that a system of checks and balances should be put into place to make sure that the end result is the best.

These principles spilled over into the Clinton White House Administration. Reinventing government was the main goal and budget cuts were being implemented left and right to make things faster better and cheaper. Goldin ignored all of the criticism he received about the budget cuts in the area of safety because he felt efficiency was more important. Due to this, the budget cut NASA’s Space Shuttle budget that included jobs that dealt with safety inspections and the preflight reviews. (These reviews and inspections were set up after Challenger)

Goldin decentralized NASA’s management structure and made JSC the lead center for all three space programs. This was something that was in place during the days of the challenger. Most employees were not happy about this change and complained that if it didn’t work before why do we want to try this a second time. Brian O’Conor complained that decentralizing power was a safety issue. He expressed that the system should stay the way it was.

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As powers changed in 2001 Sean O’Keefe who was the new administrator made it clear that deadlines MUST be met in order to keep the human space flight program. NASA’s plan was to regain its credibility by proving to its political overseers that it could meet schedules and budgets by focusing on its target date of February 19, 2003. If these goals weren’t met NASA risked losing support for subsequent growth of the Space Station. NASA was on probation. Feb 19 acquired a serious political message to everyone on all levels in the NASA organization. Briefings were given monthly to administrators and screen savers of a countdown clock were given to managers to help remind them and enforce the seriousness of completion. Headquarters was focused on achieving the date while employees saw the date as a deadline they could never meet
This internal pressure explains why managers ignored the seriousness of the foam strikes in previous shuttled launches. The shuttle Atlantis launched October 7, 2002 and the CAIB report expressed significant damages. The Program Requirement Control Board assigned it as an action item to address after the next launch. It was ruled an In-Flight Anomaly. Shuttle managers had become conditioned over time not regard foam loss or debris as a safety-of flight concern.
Everyone had different stories to tell. NASA management denies the existence of any undue launch-schedule pressures influencing their decisions. Space shuttle and space station personal disagree with this statement. They were concerned that the safety of the