Critical Notes: Cartesian Fundamentalism Feldman continues his analysis of the standard view in chapter four by attempting to trace out the foundational elements of our knowledge. He desires to get at what he calls basic justified beliefs which are the beliefs whose justification do not rely on other beliefs. Feldman describes these beliefs as the most fundamental things we can say about the world and that these beliefs allow us to further justify other types of true beliefs. He starts his analysis by examining Cartesian fundamentalism and describing its position. Cartesian fundamentalism holds that the most basic beliefs are internal appearance beliefs; meaning, the most basic things we can affirm and build knowledge off of are beliefs about our perception of the world. Feldman uses the example of Rene seeing a tree. The justified basic belief in this example is Rene’s perception of the tree. For Cartesian fundamentalists, they hold that beliefs about our internal state of minds are justified on grounds that they are indubitable and that they cannot be mistaken. Feldman easily critiques the first point of justification by pointing out that “the inability to doubt a proposition does not make it epistemically justified,” (Feldman 54). He then takes issue with the infallibility premise by showing an example of a man mistakenly thinking that he was having a sensation of pain when touching a stove when in reality the stove was not hot. This example seems to show that our internal perceptions can be mistaken.