AJP Taylor – Origins of the Second World War
Second Thoughts
- Austrian crisis was launched by Schusnigg, not Hitler
- Britain took the lead role in dismembering Czechoslovakia, not Hitler
- Two views of Hiter; 1) He wanted a great war for its own sake 2) He was a more rational and constructive figure; he had a coherent long term plan of an original nature which he pursued with unwavering resistance
- AJP Taylor maintains the view that Hitler had no long term plot and had no idea how he would come to power
- Hitler had no idea how he would get Germany out of the Depression, only the determination to do so; much of the recovery was natural
- Barton H. Klein stated the economic recovery was due to the return of private consumption and non-war types of investments
- Until the spring of 1936, ‘rearmament was largely a myth’ – Klein
- Clause 3 of the Italy Germany military talks intention of going to war with Britain and France with the intention of knocking out France first
- Italy insisted that they would not be ready for war by 1942 at the latest
- Hitler’s ambition for the vanquished Power to undo its defeat was a view shared by all Germany politicians recovering lost territory, restoring German predominance over central Europe and ending all restrictions on German armaments
- Wolfgang Sauer ‘ World War 1 proved that Germany could not be an independent power on a world scale and Hitler was foolish to try
- in 1936, according to Churchill, two independent estimates placed Germany rearmament expenditure at an annual rate of twelve thousand million marks the actual figure was five thousand million marks
- Klein argues that the reason German rearmament was on such a limited scale was; 1) Hitler didn’t want to reduce the Germany standard of living 2) Hitler didn’t want to make large war preparations because his concept of warfare didn’t require
-pretending to prepare for a great war was an essential part of Hitler’s political strategy and those who sounded the alarm against him (Churchill) did his work for him
- the accusations of the German government secretly accelerating naval building in 1909 left a permanent legacy of suspicion that the Germans would do it again
- in November 1934, Baldwin denied Churchill’s statement that German air strength was equal to that of Britain and was right
- German armament expenditure was actually cute down after Munich
Chapter 1- Forgotten Problem
-from the appeasers point of view, they can claim that appeasement was a wise and would have been a successful policy if it had not been for the fact that Hitler was in the grip of a madman
-‘The purpose of political activity is to provide peace and prosperity; and in this, every statesmen failed.’
Chapter 2- Legacy of the First World War
-when the Germans put forward their peace terms, their only concern was to improve their strategic position for the next war
-‘The Second World War grew out of the victories in the first and out of the way these victories were used
-The Americans had no concrete war aims, no precise territorial demands and so this made them less eager for an armistice
- The treaty was designed to provide security against a new German aggression, yet could only work with the cooperation of the German Government
- The important thing was not to prevent German aggression but to ensure it would take a peaceful form (Preparations should be taken against German grievances, not against German aggression)
-The French military preparations after 1919 were increasingly defensive
- Britain could not enforce the terms upon Germany if they simply did not agree to them the Germans had the advantage whereby they could undermine the system of security against them simply by doing nothing; by not paying reparations and by not disarming.
- Treaty of Versailles – had to be enforced, it did not enforce itself
-‘Those who have won one war find it difficult to conceive that they