On December 29, 1941, one of the worst nights of the Blitz, Arthur Harris watched the dome of St. Paul’s cathedral stand somehow untouched despite the Luftwaffe’s persistent bombing over London. Harris would take over RAF’s bomber command in February 1945 and become the driving force behind a controversial bombing campaign over Germany. This campaign is still a topic of debate among historians today. For example, author Richard Overy in his article, “Why the Allies Won,” argues Allied bombing played a major role in clinching Allied victory, whereas Randall Hansen in his article, “Fire and Fury,” argues Allied Bomber Command not only failed to end the war, but prolonged it. The purpose of this essay is to assess whether or not the Allied bombing campaign over Germany was justified. Ultimately, the Allied bombing campaign was justified. Although it cost a great deal of both Allied and German blood, Allied Bomber Command was justified because it diverted Germany’s resources, it destroyed German morale, and it damaged German infrastructure, thus impairing Germany’s ability to wage war.

Allied Bomber command was justified because it diverted Germany’s resources.

1. Until the middle of 1943, German air power was a critical factor on land and sea. Allied Bomber Command caused German military leaders to pull crucial air strength away from the main fighting fronts to protect the Reich. By compelling Germany to divide its air forces, German resistance in the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean was weakened, reducing effectiveness on all fronts.
2. Also, Allied Bomber Command forced Germany to divert resources, which could have turned into tanks, planes and guns, to cope with bombing. As a result in 1944, Germany had produced 35 percent fewer tanks than planned, 31 percent fewer aircraft and 42 percent fewer lorries. Germany’s anti-aircraft effort absorbed 20 percent of all ammunition produced, and so, bombing forced Germany to divide her economy between too many competing claims, none of which could be satisfied.
3. Further, the western Allies knew a German victory on the invasion beaches would have a harmful effect on their war efforts. Without the successful diversion of the German air force and economy, the Allies may have hesitated to take the risk of trying to land on the beaches of Normandy, and D-Day, one of the major turning points of WWII, might have failed the first attempt.

Allied Bomber Command was justified because it destroyed German morale.

1. Bombing was a uniquely demoralising experience. The ambition of the German citizen in the last years of the war was survival: food, water, and shelter; political resistance was the last of their priorities. People became tired, highly strung and disinclined to take risks. Not even the prospect of vengeance against the bombers could sustain morale.
2. Where businessmen in America or Britain could work away at the task of maximizing output, German managers were forced to enter an uncomfortable battlefield in which they and their workers were unwitting targets. In 1944, Absenteeism at the Ford plant in the Ruhr rose to 25 percent of the work force. By the summer of that same year, absenteeism at the BMW plant in Munich rose to 20 percent. A loss of work hours on this