SUBMITTED TO MR. KEN FRANK SMALL GROUP 7 MISSION COMMAND PAPER
BY CPT CHRIS KOLBOSKY
AMEDD CENTER AND SCHOOL, FT. SAM HOUSTON, TX 03 FEBRUARY 2014
INTRODUCTION Building a movement always challenges the status quo. Leaders must act, they must willingly risk the things they love and unfortunately, many leaders are frozen by the lethargy of indecision i. Union General George B. McClellan, who was meticulous in his planning and preparations, was also known for not aggressively challenging his opponents on a fast-moving battlefield environment. He chronically overestimated the strength of the enemy and was reluctant to apply principles of mass, He assumed September 17th would be the first day of battle. Indeed, General Lee chose the battlefield of September 17th and thereby shaped the fight. It was neither the battle he intended nor where he intended it, and because of the Lost Order fought before he was ready xxi. Still, with his skilled engineer’s eye he picked good ground on which to fight defensively xxii. He had confidence in his generals and in his troops, and they in him. Furthermore, he had confidence facing General McClellan as his opponent xxiii. There was nothing special about the fields of Sharpsburg or the waters of Antietam Creek; there was no strategic value xxiv. Although an immediate Union attack on the morning of September 16th would have had an overwhelming advantage in numbers, McClellan’s caution and belief that Lee had as many as 100,000 men at Sharpsburg caused him to delay the attack. Antietam was the first and only battle McClellan ever planned and personally directed. By not taking prudent risks, the Confederates had more time to prepare defensive positions and allowed Maj. Gen. James Longstreet’s corps to arrive from Hagerstown and Stonewall Jackson’s corps, minus A.P. Hill’s division to arrive from Harpers Ferry xxv. With the battle lines drawn, General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, organized into two large infantry corps under Longstreet and Jackson, would face off against General
