Web site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synthetic_biology
URL http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synthetic_biology
Date accessed 23/02/13
Original information Summary of information In my own words
In addition to numerous scientific and technical challenges, synthetic biology raises questions for ethics, biosecurity, biosafety, involvement of stakeholders and intellectual property.[39][40] To date, key stakeholders (especially in the US) have focused primarily on the biosecurity issues, especially the so-called dual-use challenge. For example, while the study of synthetic biology may lead to more efficient ways to produce medical treatments (e.g. against malaria, see Artemisinin, section 9.3), it may also lead to synthesis or redesign of harmful pathogens (e.g., smallpox) by malicious actors.[41] Proposals for licensing and monitoring the various phases of gene and genome synthesis began to appear in 2004. A 2007 study compared several policy options for governing the security risks associated with synthetic biology. Security risks
• Risk of man-made superbugs in hands of terrorists or escaping
• Anthrax, small pox, bio-weapons
• The need to keep the science secure
• The threat to society posed by bio-weapons The consistent threat to society from the threat of terrorists gaining this technology and creating bio-weapons of frightening capability of destruction and death.

Web site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synthetic_biology
URL http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synthetic_biology
Date accessed 23/02/13
Original information Summary of information In my own words
Some efforts have been made to engage social issues "upstream" focus on the integral and mutually formative relations among scientific and other human practices. These approaches attempt to invent ongoing and regular forms of collaboration among synthetic biologists, ethicists, political analysts, funders, human scientists and civil society activists. These collaborations have consisted either of intensive, short term meetings, aimed at producing guidelines or regulations, or standing committees whose purpose is limited to protocol review or rule enforcement. Such work has proven valuable in identifying the ways in which synthetic biology intensifies already-known challenges in rDNA technologies. However, these forms are not suited to identifying new challenges as they emerge,[45] and critics worry about uncritical complicity.[37 • “concern” groups have used unending negative to stop this information revolution
• Attempts of creating a consensus have failed Focus groups have been used to attempt to create a consensus but however the ideas of the people on both sides are often totally opposed on this that consensus are near impossible. Often it is the case that the opponents use the theory of